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Review1 
If there ever could be something like a constitutional artist, it would be 
Günter Frankenberg. A German scholar who is a disciple of the Critical 
Legal Studies approach for which Harvard's Institute for Global Law and 
Policy is well known – and with clear sympathies for postmodern thinking in 
the mould of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Pierre Legrand and their ilk.  
Before proceeding with the actual review, a reviewer's word to those for 
whom this characterisation of an author may be off-putting: don't be 
repelled, because, in contrast to much of the work of his deconstructive 
referents, Frankenberg's writing (including this latest tome) is (mostly) a joy 
to read. The book is hugely informative, provides many fresh perspectives 
and is even entertaining in places, even though there is much in it with which 
the normal reader interested in the theory and substance of constitutional 
law and comparison will not agree or feel comfortable with. 
The book has eight chapters, the first being an introductory explanation of 
the subtitle "between magic and deceit". The rest is divided into three Parts, 
and following the last chapter, there is a brief "Epilogue" outlining the 
disastrous trends in current affairs characterised by concurrent crises. 
Following this bleak outline, the last paragraph of the epilogue (and the 
book, at pp 290-291) reveals the essence of the author's intentions: 
Too sombre a note on which to end these Comparative Constitutional Studies? Then 
this epilogue should be read as a prologue, just as this textbook should be read as a 
workbook. And constitutions should not be worshipped as documents containing 
magical energies but texts with the force of law commanding close reading and critique 
to bring to the fore their ideas, ideals and ideologies. 
The narrative of magic and deceit addresses the ambitious dogmatic 
idealism characteristic of constitution writing, often hiding a strong dose of 
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cynicism on the part of those endowed with constituent and constituted 
power. On page 7 the author refers to the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 in which the "development clauses most clearly express 
the message of the egalitarian project and what many thought would be the 
magical transformative power of the document", and on page 11 he 
suggests that constitutional "magic" may be "nothing but the bright side of 
deceit". 
Part I of the book groups two chapters together under the heading "Theory 
and Method". Chapter 2 is focused on constitutional idiom and design. For 
Frankenberg a constitution is "an essentially contested and highly 
polysemous concept, generating a strong dose of symbolism" (p 25) and at 
pages 26-27 he concludes that "a modicum of deceit is required to buttress 
the belief in law and sustain the notion that political power is exercised within 
the terrain of constitutional rules, constraints and arguments". Students of 
constitutional law (for whom the author rather idealistically intended the 
book as an instrument of instruction) will indeed find much in chapter 2 to 
clarify basic notions, although only after having read one or more less 
demanding introductory texts. The notions discussed include contextual 
history and theory, classification of constitutional archetypes (manifesto, 
contract, codification and programme), the elements of constitutional 
construction (rights and principles, values and duties, allocation of political 
power and the resolution of conflict) and the impact of constitutional 
"writtenness". 
Chapter 3 addresses the increasingly contested field of the theory and 
methodology of constitutional comparison. While rejecting the notion that 
comparing constitutions is a novel and underdeveloped endeavour, the 
defensibility of seeking similarity in constitutions, striving for unitary 
solutions, normalisation of the foreign through assimilation and what is 
labelled "constitutional ethnocentrism", is disputed. Frankenberg leaves no 
stone unturned to denounce "mainstream scholars" who "not only operate 
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with a rather narrow focus, but also pursue a unitary project that confirms 
their belief in a cross-culturally coherent body of constitutional law" (p 69). 
Functionalism (supported by structuralism and factualism) is described as a 
magic carpet allowing the comparatist not to be too concerned about 
understanding the "strange laws of strange cultures" (pp 71-72). As a 
postmodernist, being equally distrustful of all methods, he presents the idea 
of comparison as narrative helpful when comparatists "create a second 
social reality" (p 85), "joining description, explanation and argumentation as 
a further rhetorical mode of discourse" (p 91). Frankenberg finds 
"constitutionalism" as an almost universally accepted idea to be a useful 
"intellectual framework" for comparison, despite the various forms it takes 
(which he discusses on pp 94-107). He concludes that there are plural forms 
of constitutionalism, in fact "constitutionalisms". 
Chapters 4 and 5 are presented as Part II under the heading "History and 
Transfer". In chapter 4 the range of notions current in the language of 
constitutional comparison describing the modalities of dissemination of 
constitutional concepts around the world (borrowing, reception, 
import/export, transplant, adaptation, influence, translation, mutation, 
migration, transfer), is played upon. The author deals with constitutional 
information as a commodity in order to "clear away the ideological mist and 
deconstruct the idealist myths that generally enshroud the practice of 
constitution-making" (pp 111-112). With some wry humour he devises an 
imaginary constitutional IKEA where "utterly formalist and positivist" ideas 
gleaned from liberal constitutionalism are made readily available in the 
"global showroom", however without "sufficient background information that 
could guide the application of norms or situate arguments in the new 
(domestic) epistemic community and political context" (p 126). Frankenberg 
denounces the reality that "constitutional architects" use "the same 
vocabulary and interchangeable construction manuals" (p 136) and urges 
the comparatist to go in search of the "odd details", for "[s]earching for odd 
details liberates comparative constitutional studies from the straightjacket of 
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unitary thinking" (p 153). He is primarily interested in how legal transfer (not 
transplant) happens, and "what happens when it happens" (p 155). 
In chapter 5 we find an adroit lesson in history, the constitutional history of 
19th Century Europe (a laboratory). The results of the experiments of that 
age continue to reverberate in the constitutional thinking and language of 
the present. An understanding of that history is essential for constitutional 
comparison. Writes Frankenberg: "[u]nless reduced to a mythical founding 
era of Great Democratic Revolutions, nineteenth-century Europe reveals a 
series of struggles between the forces of revolution and restoration" (p 161), 
and on the next page he finds that "[i]n the realm of political legitimacy, 
religion was superseded by constitutionalism." An important but seldom 
realised truth emerges from the descriptive historical discussion, namely 
that constitutions are useful ("handy") from different perspectives, because 
they "magically de-personalize political power and manifest the abstraction 
of the modern idea of the state as pure script" (p 187). 
"Order" is the theme of the three chapters of Part III. Chapter 6 deals with 
"order from conflict", but with a difference. On page 195 we read that 
"constitutional law is believed" (suggesting that the author believes 
differently) "to be primarily concerned with ordering politics", and then takes 
it in different directions, viz.: presenting the constitution as "an order of 
signs", and by extending the focus on authority to the modalities of 
coordination and cooperation. This rather obscure chapter seems to pursue 
the agenda of cerebral denunciation of conventional or mainstream 
constitutional comparison whose devices "displace the foreign, privilege the 
domestic constitution and thus turn out to be useful for quite familiar and 
political purposes" (p 198), demonstrating "a remarkable lack of concern 
about the aspect of how a social-political regime is constituted and what the 
contribution of constitutions to establish 'orderly' social-political, also 
economic relations might be" (p 199). Constitutions, it is argued, are 
attempts at balancing the struggles between individual (egoistic) demands 
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with those of society. This, he demonstrates, is done differently in 
constitutions characterised by constitutionalism in respectively the liberal, 
egalitarian and social(ist?) moulds (p 204). 
Although Frankenberg wrote in his Preface (p ix) that he did not intend 
"encyclopaedic comprehensiveness", Chapters 7 and 8 consist of a tour de 
force of concrete comparison of countless existing and some historical 
constitutions and constitutional elements. The purpose is presumably to 
serve as a demonstration of how he prefers to do actual (read "different from 
that which is purveyed by the 'textbook hegemons'") constitutional 
comparison in order to present conflictive social reality instead of the 
"wishful thinking and theoretical pipe dreams" based on assumptions of 
social homogeneity (p 223). Key concepts that he uses for flexing his 
impressive comparative muscles in Chapter 7 include "deep division", 
"fragmentation", "partition", "denial", "counterfactual narratives", 
"cooperative disagreement", and "institutional segregation", and in Chapter 
8, which deals with constitutional states of exception, the unification of 
"mystery and demons", leading to constitutional orders being "subverted by 
processes of normalization" (p 289). 
This book is good, but not easy read. Günter Frankenberg has developed a 
flair for disrupting and defying what many (especially the "mainstream" 
comparatists who are the antagonists in Frankenberg's postmodern 
universe) have come to consider core notions of constitutional 
comparativism. He does this with style, subtly ridiculing those whose efforts 
to contribute to the exploding field of constitutional comparison and its 
methodologies are different from his. It is done with such style that one might 
almost expect the denounced conventional comparatists to thank him for 
the refined (although in places less than delicate) intellectual insults directed 
at them.  
Those who feel insulted must however not refrain from reading this work 
which is so packed with information, novel ideas, fresh interpretations, 
F VENTER PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  7 
theorisation and cerebral challenges, that it is hardly of concern whether the 
readers are persuaded by the bold approach and innovative 
conceptualisations: it is likely that every reader with an interest in 
constitutional law and comparison (not only the imagined brilliant students 
for whom the author said he intended this to be a text book) will gain fresh 
insights – and may perhaps even adapt the methods they use for 
constitutional comparison against which Frankenberg has made a prima 
facie case. 
 
